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THE CISG: APPLICABLE LAW AND APPLICABLE FORUMS 
Ronald A. Brand* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG)1 is like domestic politics: what you see depends on where 
you stand. Different people observe either success or failure depending on 
what aspect of the CISG picture they are viewing. From the perspective of 
one interested in how many states are party to a treaty, the fact that the CISG 
has 93 contracting states makes it an overwhelming success in the realm of 
international private law treaties.2 On the other hand, empirical evidence that 
many private parties in some countries routinely opt out of the CISG when 
engaging in cross-border trade, paints a picture of failure.3 
The truth must lie somewhere in between, but how do we then assess 
that truth? Moreover, are there future scenarios that might change the 
evaluation of the CISG. In other words, can success or failure depend, at least 
in part, on what scholars, governments, and practitioners do with the CISG 
going forward? And can that future include new approaches to the use of the 
CISG? If the problem has been in getting private parties to choose the CISG 
as the applicable law, are there more appropriate situations for use of the 
CISG? 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor, John E. Murray Scholar, and Director, 
Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
2 UNCITRAL CISG Status Chart, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en [hereinafter Status Chart]. 
3 See, e.g., John Coyle, The Role of the CISG in Canadian Contract Practice, 38 J.L. & COMM. 69 
(2019–2020) [hereinafter Coyle, Canada]; John Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice: 
An Empirical Study, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 195, 196 (2016) [hereinafter Coyle, U.S.]. 
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In this article, I will first briefly discuss the possible tests by which the 
success or failure of the CISG might be measured. These include not only the 
number of ratifications and evidence of the adoption or rejection of the CISG 
in private commercial contracts, but other indicia of success as well. This 
latter category includes the use of the CISG as a tool of legal education, the 
use of the CISG as a template for domestic law, and the use of the CISG in 
conjunction with other recent international legal instruments dealing with 
matters other than the unification of substantive law. 
While the text of the CISG was completed in 1980, and first became 
effective in 1988,4 much has happened in the realm of private international 
law and international private law since that time. And much has happened in 
terms of developments in the way people trade, and what they trade. Much 
of cross-border trade is now in services and other property rights that do not 
fall in the traditional category of goods, and to which the CISG thus does not 
apply. Nonetheless, much cross-border trade remains—and will always be—
in goods, and the CISG is the default law for most of the global trade in 
goods. Unless we believe there is a much better solution to the problem of 
applicable law for cross-border contracts for the sale of goods, then it would 
seem that the CISG has a role to play. The question is whether that role can 
be something more than has transpired to date. 
In order to address this “something more” question, after discussing the 
current possible metrics of success and failure of the CISG, I will consider in 
particular the relationship of the CISG to both choice of forum and choice of 
law, with particular attention to developing legal frameworks which may 
offer new opportunities for the CISG which in turn might add to the success 
side of the scoreboard. In doing so, I move from the concept of the CISG as 
the applicable law, through either default operation under Article 1(1)(a) or 
party choice, to thinking about new fora in particular in which applicable 
disputes might determine applicable law to be the CISG. 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 CISG, supra note 1. 
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II. MEASURING CISG SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
A. Ratifications as International Law Success for a Treaty 
The UNCITRAL website lists 93 party states to the CISG as of May 
2020.5 These include most of the major trading nations of the world, with the 
notable exceptions of India and the United Kingdom. By any measure of 
treaty ratification, this is an overwhelming success. It makes the CISG the 
default sales contract law for a significant portion of the trade in goods 
throughout the world through the Article 1(1)(a) rule which provides that the 
Convention “applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in different States . . . when the States are Contracting 
States.” 
B. Private Party “Rejection” of the CISG 
While 93 Contracting States make the CISG the dominant international 
sales law for the world, it must be recognized that this is the default law, 
which applies if the parties to sales contracts do not opt out of the CISG. 
Article 6 of the CISG states clearly that “[t]he parties may exclude the 
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary 
the effect of any of its provisions.” Thus, party autonomy is respected, and 
private parties may choose to leave behind the default law through contract 
clauses which clearly opt out of the CISG. 
As Professor Coyle has demonstrated in greater detail, the default 
approach to the CISG is to opt out of its otherwise default contract law rules.6 
Thus, at least in the United States and Canada, the overwhelming body of 
international sales contracts contain provisions explicitly replacing the 
CISG’s default rules with the domestic law of a state. 
The tendency of private parties to opt out of the CISG in their 
international sales contracts to which it would otherwise apply can be seen 
as demonstrating that the CISG has failed in its goal to become global 
contract law. It means nothing to have law available if the parties may and 
do choose to reject it in their commercial transactions. While states may have 
voted in favor of the CISG through the process of ratification and accession, 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 Status Chart, supra note 2. 
6 Coyle, Canada, supra note 3; Coyle, U.S., supra note 3. 
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private parties seem to have voted against it in their contracts. The rules of 
the CISG are designed to and do affect the rights and obligations of private 
parties, not states, and thus its rejection by private parties may be seen as 
demonstrating its failure, despite widespread ratification by states. 
C. The CISG and the Development of Domestic Law 
Vjosa Osmani, with the example of Kosovo, has demonstrated that the 
CISG may provide a measure of success despite rejection in some corners, 
through its influence on the development of domestic sales law.7 This 
example proves that private party adoption of the CISG is not the only test 
of success. If enough states enact sales laws that conform in large part to the 
CISG, then the CISG’s rules may apply indirectly, even where private 
contracts contain provisions explicitly opting out of the CISG as the directly 
applicable law. 
D. The CISG and Legal Education 
Janet Checkley, using the Vis Moot example, has demonstrated another 
realm in which the CISG can and has had significant impact: the realm of 
legal education.8 Through the Vis Moot, students from many countries each 
year study the CISG and apply it to complex scenarios presented in the Moot 
problem. Their careful study of the CISG in this process results in thousands 
of young lawyers well versed in the CISG and able to apply it to international 
transactions, whether moot or real. 
E. The Collective Record: What Really Matters in Testing Success and 
Failure? 
Is it possible then to draw clear conclusions on the question of whether 
the CISG has been a success or a failure? And, if the result is not yet clear 
one way or the other, what might affect the final conclusion in terms of future 
developments? That is the focus of the next section of this offering. 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, Domestication of the CISG: Examples From a Few Jurisdictions, 38 J.L. 
& COM. 390, 397 (2019–2020). 
8 Janet Checkley, The Role of the CISG and International Legal Education: A Model for Future 
Promotion of the CISG, 38 J.L. & COM. 420, 425 (2019–2020). 
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III. CHOICE OF LAW, CHOICE OF FORUM, AND THE CISG: INCREASING THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF PRIVATE PARTY OPT-IN TO THE CISG 
A. Uniform Default Law, Neutral Chosen Law, and Party Autonomy: 
Apparent Success with Resulting Ambiguity 
The CISG equation at first appears to be one geared for success. 
Through the widespread ratification and accession to the Convention, the 
CISG has become the world’s principal default law for international sales 
contracts. It is also a neutral commercial law for sales contracts, allowing 
parties to avoid the uncomfortable choice of being subject to either the law 
of the seller’s state or the law of the buyer’s state. This appears to allow 
parties to choose either to avoid reference to choice of law in the contract—
because the law of the states of both parties is the CISG—or to choose the 
CISG in order to avoid being subject to the law of the state of only one of the 
parties. Thus, at first glance, there should be comfort with either allowing the 
state to choose the law (i.e., the common default law), or having the parties 
choose the law; and either way ending up with the CISG. Transaction costs 
would seem to be avoided either way. 
But, as Professor Flechtner has indicated, that has not been the real 
equation.9 Rather, the equation is one which, as Professor Flechtner describes 
it, creates a dilemma in which a choice must be made between on the one 
hand educating all transactions lawyers (and business persons) engaged in 
cross-border contract negotiations in the CISG, so that transaction costs are 
low in choosing (or defaulting to) the CISG; and, on the other hand, having 
lawyers not educated in the CISG choose the law they know over a law they 
would have to learn.10 The first would be more efficient on a global basis, 
but the second is more efficient on a single transaction basis. Of course, 
contracts are negotiated and drafted on a single transaction basis (most of the 
time). 
If, however, we could start with a contract designed to work with the 
CISG, which does not have to be drafted from scratch by every lawyer, then 
perhaps we could move from second-best to the ideal result. But Susanne 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See Harry M. Flechtner, The Past, Present and Future of the CISG (and Other Uniform 
Commercial Law Initiatives), 38 J.L. & COM. 38, 40 (2019–2020). 
10 Id. at 43. 
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Cook provided just such a contract in a Center for International Legal 
Education CISG Conference in 2005,11 and the world did not come rushing 
to her door. So, does this mean that moving from second-best to the ideal 
result is not possible? 
B. Uniform Law and Choice of Forum 
I would suggest that developments not in choice of law, but in choice of 
forum, might well provide the path to some greater success for the CISG. In 
order to understand that path, and those developments, it is useful, I believe, 
to consider various levels of contract value and sophistication. 
1. Arbitration–for the Big Guys (Who Can Afford the Transaction 
Costs)–and the New York Convention 
On one end of the spectrum lie very large multi-million-dollar contracts, 
involving large multinational companies, experienced legal departments (and 
experienced outside counsel), and the resources that should lead to first-best 
contract terms. These are the deals that generally include choice of forum 
clauses calling for arbitration. Arbitration has been the darling of large 
international commercial transactions largely because of the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, the New York Convention.12 With 163 contracting states,13 the New 
York Convention brings together even more of the world than does the CISG. 
If larger deals justify larger transaction costs, then it would seem that 
the first of the CISG equations discussed above would be applicable. Thus, 
the CISG as neutral law would be both an inviting and an economically 
possible choice. But it appears from Professor Coyle’s research on databases 
of contracts used by publicly-traded (and hence large) companies that this 
has not been the choice in either the United States or Canada.14 Whether this 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 V. Susanne Cook, Sample Agreement of Installment Sale and Purchase, in DRAFTING 
CONTRACTS UNDER THE CISG 7 (Harry M. Flechtner, Ronald A. Brand & Mark S. Walter eds., 2005). 
12 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York 
Convention”), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
13 NEW YORK CONVENTION STATUS CHART, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en. 
14 Coyle, Canada, supra note 3, at 69; Coyle, U.S., supra note 3, at 216. 
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result holds in other countries is not clear, and no published studies appear to 
be available to date. 
Arbitration is the international home of party autonomy. Parties may 
choose both the substantive and the procedural law, as well as the specific 
individuals who will serve to decide any disputes. Article II of the New York 
Convention provides for the recognition and enforcement of the agreement 
to arbitrate, and Article III provides for the recognition of the resulting award, 
in all Contracting States. The exceptions to both rules are limited. The result 
is greater predictability of the likelihood of enforcement of any dispute 
settlement decision. 
As the home of party autonomy, arbitration also allows the parties to 
choose dispute resolution professionals well-versed in the law of the contract. 
If that law is the CISG, then arbitrators may be chosen who know and can 
efficiently apply the CISG. 
The arbitration community has been heavily influenced by the 
educational tool which is the Willem C. Vis International Commercial 
Arbitration Moot. Through the Vis Moot, thousands of students each year are 
trained at nearly 400 law schools throughout the world to apply the CISG to 
a specific transaction in an arbitration setting. This process extends beyond 
the Moot itself to multiple pre-moots and a culture of intensive research and 
study which provides an excellent preparation for applying the skills required 
of a dispute resolution lawyer in a global economy. It also contributes to the 
education of the lawyers who will draft international sales contracts, helping 
us move toward the ideal solution: a world in which the CISG is known and 
understood and can be used to reduce transaction costs by being a widely 
understood set of default rules for international sales contracts as well as a 
neutral choice for carefully negotiated contracts. 
The process which has made the CISG a success as an educational tool 
can also serve as part of the process which leads to global understanding and 
a resulting reduction in transaction costs through the use of the CISG in cross-
border sales contracts. While I am not aware of any empirical study that can 
help either prove or disprove that this is actually happening, my own 
experience with Vis Moot training in the Balkans and in the Middle East (as 
explained more thoroughly by Janet Checkley) offers anecdotal proof that 
strides are being made in the right direction. 
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2. Litigation—for the Middle-Class Business Person (Reducing 
Transaction Costs) 
In the middle of the spectrum we find the “middle class litigants.”15 It 
is this group that those involved in the negotiation believed would benefit 
from the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.16 Like the 
New York Convention, the Hague Convention also provides rules respecting 
both party choice of forum and the resulting decision. Article 5 provides that 
a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have 
jurisdiction, and shall exercise that jurisdiction, with limited exceptions. 
Article 6 provides that courts in other Contracting States shall respect the 
jurisdiction of the chosen court, again with limited exceptions. Article 8 
provides that the resulting judgment shall be recognized and enforced in other 
Contracting States. Article 9 rounds out the basic set of rules by providing 
judgment recognition exceptions very similar to those found in Article V of 
the New York Convention for refusal of recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards. 
While the Hague Convention has come into effect, that is the case so far 
for only the 27 European Union Member States, Montenegro, Mexico, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom.17 China, Macedonia, Ukraine, and the 
United States have signed, but not yet ratified. Thus, the Convention does not 
have the broad effect of the New York Convention. Should a significant 
number of states become Contracting States, however, the Hague Convention 
has the potential to level the playing field with arbitration, providing broader 
opportunity for enforceable choice of forum, and making litigation a more 
palatable choice in international sales contracts. Quite simply, it would 
require that contract drafters give more careful consideration to the real 
differences (strengths and weaknesses in each transaction) between 
arbitration and litigation. 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 This is the term used by Peter Trooboff, a member of the U.S. Delegation at the Hague 
Conference of Private International Law which negotiated and concluded the 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, to describe the potential value of that Convention. See Louise Ellen Teitz, 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to 
Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 544 n.8 (2005). 
16 Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 
1294. See also Teitz, supra note 15, at 544 n.7. 
17 HAGUE CONVENTION STATUS TABLE, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/?cid=98. 
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Just as the New York Convention has been a catalyst in spawning 
competing arbitral institutions vying for the business of the dispute resolution 
community, the Hague Convention has caused the creation of competing 
commercial courts. This type of sovereign entrepreneurship on the part of 
states, designed to garner litigation business (and reap the corresponding 
taxation and other general economic benefits) has the potential to be its own 
catalyst for the use of the CISG in choice of law clauses in international sales 
contracts. 
The possibility of sovereign entrepreneurship through the creation of 
international commercial courts has become a reality, with such courts being 
created in Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Paris, and Singapore, among 
other locations. Each of these courts has a bit different structure, and it will 
take time to determine whether they have real impact in replacing current 
magnet courts for international commercial disputes like those in London and 
the Southern District of New York. In order to be successful, each of them 
will have to overcome the same dilemma faced by nascent international 
arbitration institutions: they will have to be chosen in contracts; those 
contracts will have to lead to disputes; those disputes will have to be litigated 
in the new court; decisions will have to be rendered; and a body of decisions 
will have to be created which provides predictability and proof of the value 
of the court. This last element of public decisions has the potential to create 
certain advantages for litigation in specialized courts over arbitration. But the 
entrepreneurial side of such courts clearly requires belief in long-term 
benefits. 
Many are not satisfied with the possibility of results that take decades to 
be realized. We are, however, engaged in a discussion of a treaty that was 
completed nearly 40 years ago. The fact that we are still trying to determine 
whether that treaty has been a success demonstrates clearly that the process 
of developing both international commercial law and the private international 
law that must evolve with it, is not one that can be measured in quarterly or 
annual reports. It simply takes time. And that time is measured in decades. 
Some of the new international commercial courts are doing what they 
can to try to reduce the time required to develop a reputation of competence. 
For example, the government of Singapore has appointed to the Singapore 
International Commercial Court both Singaporean judges and 16 
“international judges” from countries such as Australia, Canada, France, 
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Hong Kong, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.18 Whether 
any of these judges has expertise in the CISG is not clear from the Court’s 
website, but one could hope that some of them do. If the Hague Convention 
gains wide ratification and accession, and if an international commercial 
court in a country which is a Contracting State demonstrates efficiency as 
well as competency in cases applying the CISG, that could go far in 
encouraging parties to international sales contracts to opt-in to the CISG in 
those contracts. It could create a measure of success for the CISG which has 
so far not been achieved. It will, however, take some time to tell if that will 
occur. 
3. Online Dispute Resolution and the CISG 
Perhaps the area in which success for the CISG has the greatest 
possibility of short-term increased impact is that of online dispute resolution 
(“ODR”). As Mark Walter demonstrates, this is an area garnering a great deal 
of interest from both the private and government sectors across the globe.19 
Its real development, however, has been hindered by governments, but 
advanced by the private sector. 
A good example of how the development of ODR has been hindered by 
governments is found in the agenda at UNCITRAL, through its Working 
Group III efforts from 2010 until 2016 to prepare a set of procedural 
standards and substantive principles for ODR.20 Early in that process, many 
private sector ODR experts participated in the discussions and had hope for 
success. As the discussions continued, however, private sector participation 
diminished, largely as a result of an understanding that the project was not 
going to have practical results. The process did not result in agreed upon 
standards, with a record of the discussions saved in what became the 
“UNCITRAL Technical Notes on Online Dispute Resolution.”21 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Judges, SING. INT’L COM. CT., https://www.sicc.gov.sg/about-the-sicc/judges. 
19 Mark Walter, The CISG and Cross-Border Access to Commercial Justice, 38 J.L. & COM. 157, 
161 (2019–2020). 
20 Online Dispute Resolution (2010–2016), U.N. COMMISSION OF INT’L TRADE LAW, 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/online_dispute. 
21 U.N. Commission on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Technical Notes on Online Dispute Resolution 
(Apr. 2017), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/v1700382_ 
english_technical_notes_on_odr.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Technical Notes]. 
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During the Working Group III ODR negotiations, the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law Center for International Legal Education (CILE) 
prepared for that body two documents. The first document, which was not an 
official document of the proceedings, was distributed to delegations at the 
Twenty-Third Session of Working Group III, held on May 23–27, 2011 in 
New York, and was titled “Draft Substantive Legal Principles for Deciding 
Cases Through Online Dispute Resolution (ODR).” This document provided 
a review of the process in the United States applied by credit card companies 
when there are disputes over credit card transactions. Under the Fair Credit 
Billing Act, which is part of the Truth in Lending Act, a consumer with a 
complaint against a merchant in a sales transaction in which payment was 
made by credit card may raise claims he has against the merchant directly 
with the issuer of the credit card.22 This provides a type of alternative dispute 
resolution with the credit card issuer responsible for considering the claims 
of the consumer against the merchant. A second provision of the Fair Credit 
Billing Act, and the “Regulation Z” which implements it, set up a procedure 
for consumer complaints against merchants in sales transactions for which 
payment was made by credit card.23 If the goods or services purchased are 
“not accepted” or “not delivered . . . as agreed” (e.g., the goods did not 
comply with the contract, were different from that agreed upon, were the 
wrong quantity, or were delivered late), the law requires that the 
merchant/seller investigate and resolve the dispute if a consumer cardholder 
contacts the card issuer (within a certain time frame) and asserts such a claim. 
Resolution of the dispute in favor of the consumer may result in the 
consumer’s credit card account being credited with the disputed amount, as 
well as any related finance charges, with a corresponding charge back to the 
merchant.24 
The CILE Draft Substantive Legal Principles reviewed the online 
dispute resolution procedures used by Visa, Master Card, American Express, 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (2018); and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) 
(2019). 
23 Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2018); and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (2019). 
24 Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(e)(1). For a review of national approaches to consumer contracts, 
indicating that only the United States authorizes charge back of credit sales, see OECD, The Report on 
OECD Member Countries’ Approaches to Consumer Contracts, DSTI/CP(2006)8/FINAL (6 July 2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/28/38991787.pdf (concluding that “on the basis of the fairly large range 
of differences in the way in which the topics are handled by the countries surveyed, it may be appropriate 
for each member country to establish a system in accordance with its socio-economic circumstances, local 
idiosyncrasies and cultural characteristics (including legal culture)”). 
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and Discover. This review disclosed that the number of types of substantive 
claims considered in each of the four systems was rather limited. Because the 
dispute resolution process was carried out within the framework of a finance 
system that involved the accounts of both parties, remedies too were rather 
limited and simple, with the principal method of providing remedy being a 
charge back by which the account of the merchant was debited, and the 
account of the consumer was credited. 
Based upon the review of the U.S. credit card charge-back system, the 
following Draft Substantive Legal Principles were stated for consideration 
by Working Group III of UNCITRAL: 
Chapter I—Claims 
Principle 1—Buyer’s Right to Receive Goods, Services or Other Legal Rights 
The seller must deliver the goods, services, or other form of legal rights that are 
described in the contract. 
The buyer has a right to receive the goods, services, or other form of legal rights 
that are described in the contract. 
Principle 2—Buyer’s Right to Receive Conforming Performance 
The seller must deliver goods, services, or other form of legal rights which are of 
the quantity, quality and description required by the contract. 
The buyer has a right to receive goods, services, or other form of legal rights which 
are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract. 
Principle 3—Buyer’s Right to Receive Performance in Required Time 
The seller must deliver conforming goods, services, or other form of legal rights 
within the time required by the contract. 
The buyer has a right to receive conforming goods, services, or other form of legal 
rights within the time required by the contract. 
Principle 4—No Payment for Cancelled Recurring Transactions 
The seller may not receive payment for recurring transactions that have been 
cancelled by the buyer. 
The buyer has a right not to be charged for recurring transactions after cancellation 
by the buyer. 
Principle 5—No Duplicate Processing 
The seller may not charge a buyer more than once for any single transaction. 
The buyer has a right not to be charged more than once for any single transaction. 
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Principle 6—Correct Amount Debited/Credited 
The seller is entitled to receive the contract price. 
The buyer has a right not to be charged more than the contract price. 
Principle 7—Fraudulent and Counterfeit Transactions 
The seller has a right to receive payment only for a transaction that was contracted 
for by the buyer, or a person authorized by the buyer. 
The buyer has a right not to pay for a transaction that was not contracted for by 
the buyer, or a person authorized by the buyer. 
Chapter 2—Remedies 
Upon proof of a designated claim, the following remedies may apply: 
Principle 8—Buyer’s Right to Refund of Purchase Price 
The buyer may be credited with or paid a refund of the purchase price 
Principle 9—Buyer’s Right to Replacement or Repair 
The seller may be required to deliver replacement goods or services, or to repair 
the delivered goods. 
Principle 10—Buyer’s Right to Price Reduction and Refund 
The buyer may be credited with or paid a refund of the portion of the purchase in 
excess of the value of the goods or services delivered. 
Principle 11—Seller’s Right to Return of Goods 
The buyer may be required to return the goods in exchange for the right to receive 
any of the remedies set forth in Principles 8–10. 
The second document prepared by CILE was an official document of 
the Working Group negotiations, requested by the UNCITRAL Secretariat. 
This “Analysis and Proposal for Incorporation of Substantive Principles for 
ODR Claims and Relief into Article 4 of the Draft Procedural Rules,”25 
proposed a set of “Core Principles Underlying a Global ODR System”: 
1) The ODR system must recognize that alternatives for efficient and 
effective dispute resolution do not currently exist for cross-border, high 
volume, low value electronic transactions. 
2) The ODR system will not work unless it is simple, efficient, effective, 
transparent, and fair. Only a system that has these characteristics will 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.115 (Mar. 12, 2012). 
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invite the trust of both merchants and purchasers (including consumers) to 
enter into cross-border, high volume, low value electronic transactions that 
otherwise create risks that keep both sellers and buyers from entering into 
such transactions. The process of developing the system must recognize that 
both sellers and buyers require insurance that their interests will be protected 
in order to generate the proper level of trust in that system. If either sellers 
or buyers opt out of, or are inadequately protected by, the system, then it 
simply will not work. 
3) Simplicity and efficiency require as few exclusions from scope as 
possible. A system that begins with computer-based communication and 
analysis will not easily allow determinations that require human discretion 
or the application of difficult definitions designed to distinguish between 
types of parties to a dispute. As has been repeatedly recognized in the 
Commission and in Working Group III, it is practically and theoretically 
difficult to make a distinction not only between business-to-business and 
business-to-consumer transactions but also between merchants and 
consumers. See July 2010 Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, A/65/17, at para. 256; 3 June 2011 Report of 
Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-
third session (New York, 23–27 May 2011), A/CN.9/721, at para. 37. 
4) Simplicity, efficiency and effectiveness require that the ODR system be 
self-contained and avoid the need for reference to national rules of 
private international law. A uniform system that relies on the differences 
that exist in national rules of private international law will create disparate 
results depending on factors such as the location of parties and the need to 
“locate” the transaction. This would create difficulties that should not occur 
in the system. Additionally, there is no clear understanding internationally 
on how such determinations of applicable national law should be made (e.g. 
country-of-contract, country-of-origin, country-of-destination, or most 
significant relationship approach). Stated more simply, efficiency and 
effectiveness require that the system avoid the trap of thinking that rules of 
private international law can be used to protect the weaker party in cross-
border, high volume, low value electronic transactions. 
5) Efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency require that the ODR 
system encourage dispute resolution that results in a binding decision. 
It does little good to provide dispute settlement that still allows parties to 
relitigate what has already been decided. This is very different, however, 
from the question of retaining the option to go to national courts or utilize 
other dispute resolution mechanisms for resolution of claims that are outside 
the ODR system. (See Principle 9, below). 
6) Efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency require that the ODR 
system allow ODR providers to incorporate automatic methods for the 
enforcement of decisions (e.g., charge-back methods or automatic payment 
reversal). 
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7) Transparency and fairness require that a party to a cross-border, high 
volume, low value electronic transaction receive clear notice of the dispute 
resolution option and a separate opportunity to choose not to engage in 
a transaction if that party decides to avoid the dispute resolution process 
that is offered. 
8) Fairness requires that the ODR system be designed so that states may 
agree that the system itself is simple, efficient, effective, and 
transparent. Private international law rules that exist to protect “weaker” 
parties from unfair procedures are not necessary when states agree at the 
outset that the system of dispute resolution operates to provide adequate 
protection of the weaker party. Thus, the fairness of the system itself is the 
ultimate test of the simplicity, efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency 
required to replace protective rules of private international law. If states find 
the system to meet these tests, then the system itself will replace the need 
for “protective” rules of private international law, and will itself result in the 
type of consumer (and other) protection often sought by such rules of 
national law. This is one of those instances where a uniform system of rules 
applied on a comprehensive basis is much better than reliance on national 
rules of private international law or national rules of consumer protection. 
Simplicity, efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency can only result if 
there is a single, self-contained system, with as few opportunities as 
possible for divergence from that system through national law. 
9) Simplicity and effectiveness require that, at the outset, the substantive 
legal principles to be applied in the ODR process relate to a focused and 
limited set of fact based claims that may be brought and a focused and 
limited set of remedies that may be assessed. Existing ODR systems for 
online transactions have demonstrated that the vast majority of disputes in 
high-volume, low-value online transactions lend themselves to a small, 
discrete set of claims and remedies. More complex issues and claims (e.g., 
bodily harm, consequential damages, and debt collection) should be 
excluded from the ODR system. See 21 November 2011 Report of Working 
Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-fourth 
session (Vienna, 14–18 November 2011), A/CN.9/739, at paras. 18–19 and 
76. 
Based upon these Core Principles, the document also provided draft sample 
ODR claim and response forms for an ODR system.26 
The UNCITRAL effort to move forward on an ODR framework was 
unsuccessful largely because of different approaches to allowing consumers 
to agree to pre-dispute binding choice of forum, including ODR. The premise 
underlying the entire process was that access to courts is not access to justice 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Id. at 10–20. 
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for small online transactions. Who, after all is going to bring a lawsuit on the 
purchase of a $100 pair of shoes online and then bring a second action to 
enforce the resulting judgment in the merchant’s home court? But states with 
a prohibition on pre-dispute binding choice of forum would move forward in 
the UNCITRAL process only if consumers were allowed to always keep the 
option of going to court (the very option which it had been agreed at the 
outset did not provide access to justice), because giving up that right was 
seen as giving up access to justice. The result was that no state-centered 
framework for ODR was created.27 
The failure of UNCITRAL Working Group III may not really matter. 
The most effective ODR systems to date have not been created by states, but 
rather by private parties. Even a number of years ago, the Ebay/PayPal ODR 
system was said to be successfully handling over 60 million disputes per 
year.28 That was possible because, like the credit card charge-back system in 
the United States, the dispute resolution system is tied to the finance system, 
and enforcement is generally automatic through a charge back arrangement. 
So far at least, states seem not to have proved very effective in creating ODR 
systems, while the market place has filled this void rather well. 
So, how then does this tie in to the future of the CISG? As noted in the 
“Proposed Principles for ODR” above.29 “Simplicity, efficiency and 
effectiveness require that the ODR system be self-contained and avoid the 
need for reference to national rules of private international law.” The CISG 
does not remove all need for rules of private international law. It in fact 
requires reference to private international law in the application of its own 
terms in Article 7(2). By providing uniform substantive rules of contract 
formation and performance, it does, however, significantly reduce the need 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 The European Union has moved forward on its own ADR and ODR procedures. See Directive 
2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004; Directive 2009/22/EC 
(Directive on consumer ADR), 2013 O.J.E.U. 165/63; Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), 
2013 O.J.E.U. 165/1. 
28 Louis Del Duca, Colin Rule & Zbynek Loebl, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-
Commerce—Developing A Global Online Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived From Existing 
ODR System—Work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1 PENN ST. J.L. & 
INT’L AFF. 59, 63 (2012). 
29 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.115 (Mar. 12, 2012). 
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for reference to rules of private international law. It also provides a set of 
rules that is largely consistent with the more simply stated principles of claim 
and remedy suggested in the May 2011 CILE document presented in the 
UNCITRAL Working Group III deliberations. It also could be incorporated 
into an ODR system in which the three stages of ODR noted in the 
UNCITRAL Technical Notes would be applied: negotiation; facilitated 
settlement; and a third (final) stage.30 
While the third stage of the process was not specifically stated as 
arbitration in the UNCITRAL Technical Notes, that could in fact be the 
procedure in the third stage, initially facilitated electronically and ultimately 
(but only if required) involving real persons stepping in to conclude the 
matter in a binding decision. This would place the process within the 
framework of the New York Convention. While actual use of the New York 
Convention for recognition and enforcement would not occur in the smallest 
transactions, the ability to have it available should increase actual compliance 
with final decisions. This third stage is the point at which it is most logical to 
have a single sales law governing all transactions so as not to violate the goals 
of simplicity and efficiency. This is where the CISG characteristics of 
uniformity and neutrality serve to make it a logical exclusive law to be 
applied in such an ODR system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods has been available to states since 1980 and to private parties since 
1988. In its nearly four decades of existence, it has been embraced by 93 
states. At the same time it appears to be often rejected by private parties in 
their international sales contracts, at least in some countries. It has served as 
a source for the development of national commercial law and a platform for 
legal education in international sales law. Yet, it is probably too soon to 
declare it either a success or a failure. The ultimate determination of success 
will likely require both more time and the consideration of the applicable 
forum as well as the applicable law. There remains significant opportunity 
for success at three levels of international sales contract relationships: large 
contracts often accompanied by arbitration clauses; “middle class” contracts 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 UNCITRAL Technical Notes, supra note 21, ¶ 18. 
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that may fit well into developing international commercial courts and the 
2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; and small and 
medium-sized contracts which lend themselves to the developing area of 
online dispute resolution. Our hope should be that the equation for success is 
to be determined not by lawyers and business persons who do not want to 
spend the time learning about one more sales law, but rather by the role the 
CISG can play in providing both uniformity and neutrality in developing 
legal landscape. 
